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Abstract
This research focuses on the role played by cultural norms in the long
run persistence of gender inequalities. Cultural norms about gender roles
are considered to be endogenous and can generate gender inequality and low
development traps. Indeed, when the gender gap is internalized, it leads to
inegalitarian views about gender roles. Due to these inegalitarian beliefs,
boys receive more education and the initial gender gap is reinforced. The
existence of gender inequality traps is pointed out by the World Bank as a
major obstacle for economic development (WDR 2006). The present article
allows for a better understanding of the persistence of such traps and the
means to escape.
Résumé
Cet article s’intéresse au rôle joué par les normes culturelles dans le
phénomène de persistance des inégalités hommes-femmes. Les normes cul-
turelles régissants le rôle respectif des hommes et des femmes sont supposées
endogénes et peuvent générer l’émergence de trappes à inégalité et à pau-
vreté. En effet, les inégalités entre genres sont internalisées par les agents et
conduisent à une vision inégalitaire du rôle que doit jouer chacun au sein de
la société. A cause de ces croyances inégalitaires, les garçons reçoivent une
éducation supérieur à celle reçue par les filles et l’inégalité initiale est renfor-
cée. L’existence de trappes à inégalité entre hommes et femmes est mis en
avant par la Banque Mondiale comme un des obstacle majeur au dévéloppe-
ment économique (WDR 2006). Cet article permet de mieu comprendre la
persistence de ce type de trappe et les moyens d’en sortir.
JEL Codes: J16, O15, Z10.
Keywords: Gender Equality, Endogenous Cultural Norms, Economics
Development, Inequality Traps.
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1 Introduction
This article deals with the role played by endogenous cultural norms about
gender roles in the persistence of gender inequalities and the economic de-
velopment. It highlights a two way causality between norms and educational
gender gap. On the one hand, gender differences in education determine
the women participation to the labor market, which affects individuals views
about their role within the society. For instance, a low level of participation
induces a widespread belief that women have a comparative advantage in
housework rather than on the labor market. On the other hand, due to this
inegalitarian belief, parents would value less girls education compared to the
education of boys. It results in a joint evolution of both the level of human
capital in the economy and the gender role attitudes.
In an economy initially poor (where neither men nor women receive edu-
cation), task sharing between men and women is determined by the relative
physical srength of each spouse. Men being endowed with more strength,
their labor supply is higher. Consequently, gender role attitudes favor the
boys. Since boys are initially favored, as the economy develops, men are the
first to receive education. Men’s education allows for further developments
of the economy through the accumulation of human capital. However, this
accumulation has a perverse effect. Indeed, it increases the productivity gap
between men and women, which leads to a decrease of the relative labor
supply of women and to less egalitarian views about gender roles. Conse-
quently, a country can be trapped in a long-run situation in which only men
are educated. Conversely, if the accumulation of mens’ education leads to a
level of development which allows for the education of girls, the economy con-
verges towards a high-output equilibrium characterized by a relative equality
between men and women. Indeed, a rise in women’s education implies a de-
crease of the relative productivity of men. As a consequence, the relative
labor supply of women increases and views about gender roles become less
traditional.1
The World Development Report 2006 documents the existence of inequal-
ity traps. Among them, the gender inequality trap has a central place. More-
over, the report points out the role of cultural norms in the perpetuation of
1I use here the terminology of Farre and Vella (2007), the term traditional reflects the
view that women should specialize in home production and men in market.
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gender differences and then, in the persistence of this kind of traps.2 The
model presented below, allows to take into account the importance of social
norms in the persistence of unequal opportunities between genders. The fact
that boys receive more education than girls is not an efficient choice but
results from the weight of inegalitarian social norms. In turn, these choices
tend to increase the gender inequalities on the labor market and then to
reinforce the inegalitarian norms.
The proposed theory also suggests that gender inequalities may impede
the economic development. The negative relationship between gender in-
equality and development or economic growth has been highlighted by sev-
eral empirical studies. Controlling for potential endogeneities (the level of
development affects the level of gender inequality), Klasen (1999) and Dol-
lar and Gatti (1999) find that gender inequalities in education have a direct
and negative impact on economic growth. Knowles et al. (2002) estimate
a neoclassical growth model including male and female education. They
also conclude that the educational gender gap is a barrier to the economic
development.
Finally, the present model enables to replicate the U-shaped relationship
between female labor supply and economic development. This relationship
has been highlighted both in cross-country analysis 3 and on longitudinal
data. 4 However, few theoretical works give foundations to these findings.5
In the present paper, the less developed countries are characterized by no
education for both men and women, then the sole difference in labor market
opportunities comes from physical strength or discrimination towards women:
2WDR 2006, p.51: "Gender inequity is the archetypical inequality trap. Most societies
have norms that preserve the prevalent social order, delineating different roles and spheres
of influence for men and women. The male sphere is typically outside the home in market
work [...] The female sphere is usually inside the home - looking after household work,
rearing children, and contributing to the stability of the household."
3see Durand (1975), Goldin (1995), Cagatay and Olzer (1995) or Mammen and Paxson
(2000).
4see Goldin (1995) for the United State for the period since 1790 or Mammen and
Paxson (2000) for evidence from Thailand and India.
5Galor and Weil (1996) propose two extensions of their basic model in order to obtain
this relationship. The first one focuses on the role of the high child mortality at low levels
of development; the second one considers the existence of a non-modern production sector
requiring no capital. In both cases, the initial fall of women labor participation comes
with a fertility rise.
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It results in a substantial participation of women to the labor market. During
early stages of development, only mens’ education increases. Then, the pro-
ductivity gap between men and women rises and the labor supply of women
falls. Then, if the economy reaches a sufficient level of development, women
are also educated and the gender gap in labor productivity is progressively
filled. It corresponds to the rising portion of the U-curve.
The two following sections deal with the theoretical literature related to
the present article and the empirical foundations associated with the law of
evolution of gender roles.
2 Related literature
The present article aims at building a bridge between a literature focusing on
the relationship gender inequalities - economic development; and a literaure
which consider cultural norms about gender roles as endogenous.
The relationship between gender gap and economic development has been
investigated in overlapping generations models with endogenous fertility. In
their seminal work, Galor and Weil (1996) assume that men have greater
physical strength than women while men and women have the same amount
of mental input. The economy is initially in a Malthusian trap, characterized
by a high fertility and a low development level. Due to the process of capi-
tal accumulation, returns of mental input increase while returns of physical
strength remain constant. Consequently, the relative productivity of women
rises which generates the fertility transition. I depart from this framework,
focusing on the accumulation of human capital rather than physical capital.
Moreover, the present model gives a role to the culture in the relationship
between the gender gap and economic development.
The article of Lagerlöf (2003) is more closely related to my own. The
author focuses on the accumulation of human capital and explains the differ-
ent endowments in education of men and women by cultural factors. Parents
invest in education in order to maximize the total income of the future house-
hold into which their children enter. A coordination game between families
arises: if all families favor the education of boys, the optimal choice is to
act the same. It results in a continuum of Nash equilibria which determine
the share of education between girls and boys. In this framework, cultural
norms allow for the coordination of all families on one equilibrium. Taking
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historical illustrations, the author assumes that cultural norms favor initially
boys, but progressively evolve towards less traditional views about gender
roles. Then, the economy re-coordinates at each date on a more egalitarian
Nash equilibrium. This evolution enables to reproduce the long run pattern
of demographic and economic history in Europe. My approach differs from
Lagerlöf’s one by considering the process of cultural evolution as endoge-
nous. It allows to generate gender inequalities traps which are absent from
the Lagerlöf’s model.6
Another recent paper, from de la Croix and Vander Donckt (2008), con-
siders the role of social norms in a model in which fertility, gender gap and
bargaining power within the household are endogenized. Social norms rep-
resent the part of bargaining power which is not endogenously determined.
It captures the societal and institutional propensity of a country towards
gender equality. In this framework, social norms are exogenous and their
evolution do not enable to escape from the Malthusian trap.
The major difference of my own approach with respect to this literature
is the absence of endogenous fertility behaviors. This aspect is discussed in
section 8. The model assumes that individuals spent time in order to produce
a domestic good, men and women having the same abilities in the production
of this good. This formulation simplifies the analysis and avoids the complete
specialization of tasks within the household. It allows to endogenize the
gender role attitudes in a simple and relevant way. Moreover, the uncomplete
specialization complies with empirical observations (see de la Rica et al.
(2008) for European data).
A second part of the literature related to this article focuses on the endo-
geneity of gender roles. Escriche et al. (2004) assume that women differ by
their views about gender role. These different opinions correspond to various
preferences: women have either job-priority or family-priority preferences.
The process of preferences evolution is in line with the model of cultural
transmission of Bisin and Verdier (2001). The policy adopted by the firms
(discriminatory or not) depends on their expectations about the proportion
of family-priority women. In turn, the parental incentives to transmit family-
priority preferences increase with the level of discrimination set by the firm.
6I also adopt an alternative definition of culture. Lagerlöf (2003) considers cultural
norms as a mean to coordinate on one equilibrium, in my model, cultural norms directly
affect preferences.
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It results in the existence of two possible long run equilibria: the discrim-
inatory and the non-discriminatory one. The discriminatory (respectively
non-discriminatory) equilibrium is characterized by a high (low) proportion
of family-priority women and a discriminatory (non-discriminatory) firms’
policy. The present paper also highlights the complementarity between dis-
crimination on the labor market and more traditional gender role attitudes.
As previously pointed out, it could then induce multiple equilibria.
Fernandez et al. (2004) consider cultural norms as a parameter of men’s
utility function: men suffer a potential disutility when their wife works. They
also assume that the proportion of men having traditional views about gender
roles (i.e. suffering a disutility if their wife works) evolves endogenously.
More precisely, a man’s disutility of a working wife depends on whether his
mother worked outside the home. In this framework, an exogenous positive
shock on the women labor market participation (as the advent of the World
War II), increasing the proportion of working mothers, induces the diffusion
of modern gender role attitudes. In line with this work, I also assume that
the observation of women labor supply behaviors shape beliefs about gender
role within the society.
In this article, the relationship between gender role attitudes and labor
supply is integrated in an OLG model. It enables to highlight the conse-
quences of the endogeneization of cultural norms on economic development.
3 On the definition and evolution of gender role
attitudes
A growing literature provides evidences relating culture and economic deci-
sions (see Fernandez (2006) for a brief overview). A part of this literature
focuses on the role of cultural norms about gender roles. Vella (1994), Farré
and Vella (2007), Fernandez (2007) and Fernandez and Fogli (2007) conclude
that these norms have quantitative and significant effects on women’s labor
force participation decisions.
In the present article, the relationship between culture and labor mar-
ket outcome is indirect. Cultural norms affect educational choices of par-
ents for their children which, in turn, impact children’s participation deci-
sions. Few empirical works investigate the link between gender role attitudes
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and investment in human capital. On Australian data, Vella (1994) finds
that traditional beliefs about gender roles reduce human capital investment
for girls. Concerning developing countries, cultural factors, as patriarchal
norms are commonly cited in sociological studies, as a reason for girls’ lim-
ited school participation (see for instance Greenhalgh (1985), Davison and
Kanyuka (1992) or Hyde (1993)).
Cultural norms about gender role are assumed to have two components:
a slow-moving component (exogenous in the model) and a fast-moving com-
ponent (endogenous in the model). The distinction between slow-moving
and fast moving components of culture is made by Guiso et al. (2006). It
captures the fact that part of cultural norms in a society is persistent and
not much affected by agents decisions. It is typically the case of religious
norms. Using the World Value Survey, Guiso et al. (2003) show that religion
is positively related with traditional views about gender roles.7
The fast moving component of gender roles attitudes is transmitted across
generations but is also affected by the observation of the relative labor sup-
ply behaviors of men and women. Fernandez et al. (2004), Farré and Vella
(2007), Fernandez (2007) and Fernandez and Fogli (2007) provide evidences
on the intergenerational transmission of cultural attitudes regarding the role
of women. Concerning the impact of women labor supply on gender role atti-
tudes, Farré and Vella (2007), Fernandez (2007) and Kawaguchi and Miyazaki
(2008) argue that wives of men whose mother worked, are themselves signifi-
cantly more likely to work. One interpretation of this finding is the following:
men growing up with a working mother have acquired a more modern view
about gender roles.
Again, the mechanisms at play differ in the model. It is the observation
of the "average behavior" in the whole population which influences opinions
about gender roles. This assumption is in line with the theories of statistical
discrimination (pioneering by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) works): A
relatively low participation of women on the labor market leads to the belief
that they have a comparative advantage in housework rather than in market
7Authors measure gender role attitudes thanks to various questions on the role of
women within the society. Among them, respondents have to give their level of agreement
with the following statement: "A university education is more important for a boy than
for a girl". This question is closely related with our definition of gender roles since it
deals with the relative weight given by parent to the education of boys and girls. Authors
conclude that, to be actively religious rise the probability to agree with this statement.
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activities. My mechanism of preferences formation also complies with the
litterature highlighting the role of social norms and habit formation on in-
dividual attitudes in the labor market (Blomquist (1993), Lindbeck (1995),
Lindbeck et al. (1999), Farria and Leon-Ledesma (2004), Jakee and Guang-
Zen (2005) or Bonatti (2008)). Indeed, in this litterature, individual prefer-
ences are shaped by average behaviors in the whole society or in reference
groups. Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) provide evidences on the positive effect
of reference group mean of participation rate on the female labor supply.
4 The model
4.1 Basic structure
Consider a two-sex overlapping generations economy. Each individual lives
for two periods. During the childhood, men and women are identical and
receive education. During the adulthood, both men and women work, either
at home or on the labor market. They differ in terms of their ability to earn
wages on the labor market. In line with Galor and Weil (1996), I assume
that men are endowed with physical strength and mental input while women
are only endowed with mental input.8 Moreover, the amount of mental input
of each individual depends on her/his level of education.
This level of education is chosen by parents. Two parents (one man and
one woman) compose a couple and each couple has two children (one boy
and one girl). Women and men have the same preferences such that couples
are taken to have a joint consumption and a joint utility. In addition, since
there is no heterogeneity within each generation, the features of matching
process do not matter: men and women are randomly matched.
4.2 Production
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time shared between house-
work and work on the labor market. In line with Zick et al. (2008), house-
work includes meal preparation, clean up, laundry, shopping, maintenance
8This assumption justifies the initial differences of gender roles. As discussed in section
8, it can be relaxed assuming, for instance, that women are discriminated on the labor
market.
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of residence, child care, gardening or even bookkeeping related to house-
hold management. In this model, all these activities are represented by the
production of a composite good, namely a domestic good. The quantity of
time devoted to housework by an individual i at date t, is denoted lit, with
i ∈ {f,m}. Moreover, the housework time exhibits decreasing returns: a
quantity of time lit implies the production of (l
i
t)
γ units of domestic good,
γ ∈ (0, 1). This assumption captures fatigue effects associated with the pro-
duction of the domestic good. It follows that, the total amount of domestic
good produced by a couple at date t (denoted Dt) equals:
Dt = (l
f
t )
γ + (lmt )
γ (1)
This implies that men and women produce the same amount of domestic
good providing an equal quantity of time.9
When individuals do not work at home, they offer remaining time (1 −
lit) on the labor market in order to produce a manufactured good. Labor
is the only input used in the production of this good. It is composed of
both physical strength and mental input. Strength and mental input are
assumed to be perfect subsitutes such that, the wage per unit of labor, i.e.
the productivity of one unit of labor, is equal to:
wit = s
ib+ h(eit) (2)
with si the endowment of physical labor for the individual i ∈ {m, f} and b
the productivity of one unit of physical strength. To simplify, it is assumed
that women have no physical strength while men have a positive amount of
it. Formally, it comes:
si =
{
0 if i = f
1 if i = m
(3)
h(eit) represents the level of mental input (human capital) of an individual
i. It is positively related to the level of education (eit) received by her/him
during the childhood. Moreover, it is assumed that h(0) > 0. It implies
that each individual is endowed with a minimum amount of mental input
9The production function of household good proposed by Fernandez et al. (2004)
displays the same properties that my own. Consider a CES production function (as in
Albanesi and Olivetti (2006, 2007)) does not affect our results.
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even if she/he did not receive any education (see Moav (2005) for further
discussions).10
4.3 Preferences and budget constraint
The preferences of a couple of generation t are defined over consumption of
domestic and manufactured goods (respectively denoted Dt and Ct) as well
as over the human capital of their children. Preferences are represented by
the following utility function:
Ut = µ lnCt + (1− µ) lnDt + β
[
θt ln(h(e
f
t+1)) + ln(h(e
m
t+1))
]
(4)
The parameter θt denotes the relative weight given to education of the daugh-
ter compared to the education of the son in parental preferences. θt is re-
garded as a measure of parental views about gender roles. Indeed, if parents
think that women are more productive at home, they will give less weight to
the education of girls compared to the education of boys and θt < 1. θt is
considered as given when parents decide on their choices of education. How-
ever, this parameter is endogenous (see section 4.7) and its evolution is partly
determined by the female labor supply: higher is the women’ participation,
weaker is the belief that women have a comparative advantage in housework.
To comply with empirical regularity that women had never been more edu-
cated than men along the process of development, the study focuses on the
case θ0 < 1. It implies that parents initially favor boys. As it will be shown,
under this condition θt ≤ 1 for all date t. Thus, the analysis is restricted to
the case:
θt ≤ 1 (5)
implying emt ≥ e
f
t . However, the case θt ≥ 1 could also be considered.
The couple’s earnings are used to consume the manufactured good and
to educate children. These earnings equal the wages received on the labor
market. Hence, through (2) and (3), the budget constraint of the couple is:
(1− lft )h(e
f
t ) + (1− l
m
t )(h(e
m
t ) + b) = Ct + τ
[
eft+1 + e
m
t+1
]
(6)
10Identical results are obtained assuming that parents face a hierarchy of need, children’s
education coming after consumption (see Strulick (2003)).
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with τ the relative cost of one unit of education and eit+1 the quantity of
education chosen for a child i.
The representative couple maximizes its utility (4) by choosing Ct, Dt, l
f
t ,
lmt , e
f
t+1 and e
m
t+1 subject to the budget constraint (6) and the technological
constraint on the domestic production (1).
4.4 Optimization
The optimization, with respect to the labor supply of men and women (lft
and lmt ), implies that:
µh(eft )
γ(1− µ)Ct
=
(lft )
γ−1
(lft )
γ + (lmt )
γ
(7a)
µ(h(emt ) + b)
γ(1− µ)Ct
≥
(lmt )
γ−1
(lft )
γ + (lmt )
γ
(7b)
Under restriction (5), it is straightforward that lft < 1, hence (7a) holds
with equality. (7b) holds with equality if the optimal choice on lmt is interior
(lmt < 1). The analysis is restricted to that case. It leads to a relationship
between the optimal values of lmt and l
f
t :
lmt =
(
h(eft )
h(emt ) + b
) 1
1−γ
lft (8)
This describes the share of housework between men and women. It con-
sists in the equalization between the relative productivity of men at home:
(lmt /l
f
t )
1−γ and the relative opportunity cost of housework: (h(emt )+b)/h(e
f
t ).
Consequently, higher is the relative productivity of men on the labor mar-
ket, higher is the relative time of women devoted to the production of the
domestic good.
The total amount of human capital of a couple of the generation t is:
ht = h(e
f
t ) + h(e
m
t ). The FOCs (7b) and (7a) and the budget constraint (6)
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allow to obtain the expressions of lft and l
m
t :
lft =
γ(1− µ)
µ+ γ(1− µ)
ht + b− τ
[
eft+1 + e
m
t+1
]
h(eft )
[
1 +
(
h(eft )
h(emt )+b
) γ
1−γ
] (9a)
lmt =
γ(1− µ)
µ+ γ(1− µ)
ht + b− τ
[
eft+1 + e
m
t+1
]
(h(emt ) + b)
[
1 +
(
h(emt )+b
h(eft )
) γ
1−γ
] (9b)
It results in an expression of the optimal level of consumption:
Ct =
µ
µ+ γ(1− µ)
(
ht + b− τ
[
eft+1 + e
m
t+1
])
(10)
The optimal share between housework and work on the market being
given for the two spouses, the following section focuses on the optimal edu-
cation choices.
4.5 Educational choices
Let consider the optimization with respect to the education of children, emt+1
and eft+1:
h′(eft+1)
h(eft+1)
≤
τµ
βθtCt
(11a)
h′(emt+1)
h(emt+1)
≤
τµ
βCt
(11b)
(11a) (respectively (11b)) holds with equality if the optimal value of eft+1
(respectively emt+1) is strictly positive.
From now on, the following form for the function h(e) is assumed:
h(eit) = c+ ae
i
t (12)
As previously mentioned, this expression prevents human capital from being
zero even if parents do not invest in education. The level of human capital is
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a linear function of the level of education11, c > 0 embodies the productivity
of workers’ basic mental skills while a > 0, is a measure of the education’s
productivity.
Using (10) and (12), (11a) and (11b) can be rewritten as:
ht + b ≤
τ
aβθt
(
c+ aeft+1
)
+ τ
[
eft+1 + e
m
t+1
]
(13a)
ht + b ≤
τ
aβ
(
c+ aemt+1
)
+ τ
[
eft+1 + e
m
t+1
]
(13b)
The following sub-section focuses on the optimal choices of education in the
case of an interior solution and in the case of a corner solution.
4.5.1 Interior solution
The optimal choices of education lead to an interior solution if both (13a)
and (13b) hold with equality. In this case, the ratio (13a) over (13b) yields:
c+ aemt+1
c+ aeft+1
=
1
θt
(14)
This ratio measures the educational gap between men and women. It is a
decreasing and convex function of θt. Indeed, a high value of θt implies that
the weight associated with girls education in parental preferences is close
to the weight associated with boys education. It induces a relatively equal
endowment for boys and for girls and a small educational gender gap.
The optimal level of education for a girl and a boy are deduced from
(13a), (13b) and (14):
eft+1 =
aβθt(ht + b)− τc(1 + β(1− θt))
aτ(1 + β(1 + θt))
(15a)
emt+1 =
aβ(ht + b)− τc(1− β(1− θt))
aτ(1 + β(1 + θt))
(15b)
11Results are unaffected if decreasing returns of education are assumed. However, the
assumption of constant returns in education simplify the exposition.
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4.5.2 Corner solutions
From (13a) and (13b), parents choose to educate only their son if:
ht <
(1 + β)τc− βθt(τc+ ab)
aβθt
≡ h˜(θt) (16)
In that case the optimal value of emt+1 is the following:
emt+1 =
aβ(ht + b)− τc
aτ(1 + β)
(17)
h˜(θt) is decreasing and convex in θt, with h˜(1) = τc/aβ−b and limθt→0 h˜(θt) =
+∞.
Since θt ≤ 1, the symmetric case (e
f
t+1 > 0 and e
m
t+1 = 0) never occurs.
Finally, if both (13a) and (13b) hold with inequality when eft+1 = 0 and
emt+1 = 0, parents give no education to their children. It is the case if:
ht <
τc
aβ
− b = h˜(1) (18)
Then, the plan (θt, ht) can be divided as depicted in Figure 1.
ht
0
h˜(1) = τc
αβ
− b
h˜(θt)
1 θt
emt+1 > 0
e
f
t+1 > 0
emt+1 > 0
e
f
t+1 = 0
emt+1 = 0
e
f
t+1 = 0
Fig. 1. Corner solutions in education
If ht is too low (lower than h˜(1)), parents choose to provide no education
to their children. The economy is in the poverty regime. For intermediary
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values of income (ht ∈ [h˜(1), h˜(θt)]), only boys are educated. It corresponds
to the gender inequality regime. Finally, for a large enough level of develop-
ment (ht > h˜(θt)) both boys and girls receive education. It is the interior
regime.
Notice that, for a given value of ht, the probability to be in the gender
inequality regime decreases with θt (h˜(θt) is decreasing in θt). Indeed, if θt
is low, the importance of girls education in parental preferences is small.
Consequently, the level of development required for the education of women
is high.
4.6 Evolution of human capital
From the previous section, it follows that optimal levels of education eft+1
and emt+1 depend on ht, θt and parameters of the model. It implies that the
total level of human capital at date t + 1 (ht+1) is a function of ht and θt.
Let define the function χ(θt) as follows:
χ(θt) ≡
β
τ(1 + β(1 + θt))
(19)
It directly comes from (12) and (15a)-(19) that:
h(eft+1) =


c if ht < h˜(1)
c if ht ∈ [h˜(1), h˜(θt)]
χ(θt)θt[a(ht + b) + 2τc] if ht > h˜(θt)
(20a)
h(emt+1) =


c if ht < h˜(1)
χ(0)[a(ht + b) + τc] if ht ∈ [h˜(1), h˜(θt)]
χ(θt)[a(ht + b) + 2τc] if ht > h˜(θt)
(20b)
As a consequence:
ht+1 =


2c if ht < h˜(1)
c+ χ(0)[a(ht + b) + τc] if ht ∈ [h˜(1), h˜(θt)]
χ(θt)(1 + θt)[a(ht + b) + 2τc] if ht > h˜(θt)
≡ ρ(ht, θt)
(21)
The dynamics of ht is characterized by the three regimes described previously.
In the poverty regime, there are no education, then ht remains constant. In
the gender inequality regime, the rise in ht is driven by the increase of men’s
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education. In the interior regime, the education of both men and women
enable the increase of human capital.
In interior and gender inequality regimes, ht+1 is a linear function of ht.
Then, the dynamics of ht exhibits a steady state only if the slope of ht+1 with
respect to ht is lower than unity. A sufficient condition for the existence of a
steady state in both interior and gender inequality regimes is:
τ >
2β
1 + 2β
a (22)
It implies that the costs of education are not too low with respect to the
returns of education.12
4.7 Evolution of the gender roles
The parameter θt is a measure of the parental bias towards boys. This
cultural parameter is composed of a fast-moving component and a slow-
moving one:
θt = (1− λ)ψt (23)
λ ∈ (0, 1), captures the exogenous (slow-moving) part of the norm. If λ is
great, the views about gender roles remain inegalitarian whatever the partic-
ipation of women on the labor market. ψt represents the endogenous (fast-
moving) part of the norm. It depends both on ψt−1, the existing norm within
the previous generation (due to the intergenerational transmission of gender
role attitudes), and the ratio lft /l
m
t (i.e. the relative time spent by women to
work at home). Indeed, the observation by parents of a change in women par-
ticipation induces an evolution of their view of gender role. If lft /l
m
t increases,
the role of women is more associated to housework, then the education of the
daughter is less valued. Formally, it is assumed that:
ψt = σψt−1 + (1− σ)
(
lmt /l
f
t
)κ
(24)
The parameter σ ∈ (0, 1) measures the strength of habits. Higher is σ, the
more persistent is the gender bias. Expressions (23) and (24) joint with
condition (14) imply that an increase in the relative labor supply of men
induces a decrease of the relative investment in girls education. This result
12This condition is no more needed in the case of decreasing returns of education.
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can be supported, for instance, by the findings of Rosenzweig and Schultz
(1982) on Indian’s data. From (8), it results that:
θt+1 = σθt + (1− σ)(1− λ)
(
h(eft+1)
h(emt+1) + b
) κ
1−γ
(25)
It follows from (20a) and (20b) that θt+1 can be expressed as a function of
θt and ht so that θt+1 = η(ht, θt).
5 The dynamical system
The development of the economy is characterized by the trajectories of the
human capital (ht) and gender roles attitudes (θt). Then, the sequence
{ht, θt}
∞
t=0 determines the dynamic path of the economy. It is driven by
a bi-dimensional, first-order dynamical system given by equation (21) and
(25): {
ht+1 = ρ(ht, θt)
θt+1 = η(ht, θt)
(26)
where h0 and θ0 are given. The analysis of the system requires the derivation
of its phase diagram. The first step is to characterize the hh and θθ loci
where ht and θt are respectively in a steady state.
5.1 The hh locus
Let hh be the locus of all pairs (ht, θt) such that ht is constant: hh ≡ {(ht, θt) :
ht+1 = ht}. Features of this locus depend on the regime which characterized
the economy. Later on, the three regimes are successively considered. Figure
2 is deduced from the analysis of the hh locus (see Appendix A).
The horizontal line ht = 2c corresponds to the hh locus in the poverty
regime. Indeed, in this regime there are no education and the total amount
of human capital is constant and equal to 2. In the case (b), h˜(1) < 2c then
the horizontal line ht = 2c is no more in the poverty regime. Thus, even if
there is initially no education in the economy, the accumulation of human
capital is possible and the economy always escape from the poverty regime.
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(a) h˜(1) > 2c
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(b) h˜(1) < 2c
Fig. 2. The hh locus
In the gender inequality regime, the accumulation of human capital is
only driven by the education of men. Then, ht+1 is a function of ht but is
unaffected by the value of θt (see expression (21)). When condition (22) is
satisfied, ht converges towards a constant value h
hh
gi , independent of θt.
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In the interior regime, both men and women are educated. Since a rise
of θt induces an increase in the overall weight of education in the utility of
parents, it implies an augmentation of the total investment in education. It
follows that the stationary value of human capital (denoted hhhi (θt)) is an
increasing function of θt.
5.2 The θθ locus
Let θθ be the locus of all pairs (ht, θt) such that θt is constant: θθ ≡ {(ht, θt) :
θt+1 = θt}. Condition (27) is assumed to hold in the following, such that
Figure 3 depicts the θθ locus (see Appendix B).
κ < 1− γ (27)
The level of ht influences the locus of stationarity of θ through its effect
on the relative labor supply of men and women. In the poverty regime, this
13hlr denotes the value of human capital on the locus l ∈ {hh, θθ} in the regime r ∈ {gi, i}
(gi denotes the gender inequality regime and i the interior regime).
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Fig. 3. The θθ locus
relative labor supply is exogenous, independent of ht, then the locus consists
in a vertical line.
In the gender inequality regime, an increase of ht induces a rise of the level
of education of men, while this level remains constant for women. Then, the
relative productivity of men on the labor market, and consequently their
relative labor supply, is increasing in ht. Hence, the level of θt which ensures
its stationarity decreases with ht.
In the interior regime, an increase of ht induces a rise of the education for
both men and women. It increases the relative productivity of women and
then their relative labor supply. In this case, the level of θt which corresponds
to stationarity increases with ht.
5.3 Steady state equilibria
Steady-state equilibria of the dynamical system are pairs {h¯, θ¯} such that:{
h¯ = ρ(h¯, θ¯)
θ¯ = η(h¯, θ¯)
(28)
It consists in the intersections between the hh and the θθ locus. Through
representations of the two loci (Figure 2 and 3), it follows:
Proposition 1 Under conditions (22) and (27), The steady states of the
dynamic system (26) display the following features:
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i (a) if h˜(1) > 2c, there exists a locally stable equilibrium in the poverty
regime; (b) if h˜(1) < 2c, there are no steady sate in the poverty regime;
ii in addition, there are at least: (1) one equilibrium in the gender inequal-
ity regime, if it is unique, it is globally stable; or (2) one equilibrium
in the interior regime, if it is unique, it is globally stable; and, at most
(3) three equilibria, one locally stable in the gender inequality regime,
one locally stable in the interior regime, and the last unstable.
Proof See Appendix D 
If h˜(1) > 2c, it directly follows from Figures 2(a) and 3 that the hh locus
and the θθ locus cross once in the poverty regime. It results in the existence
of one equilibrium in this regime, namely the poverty trap. This equilibrium
is locally stable so that, if the initial level of human capital is lower than h˜(1)
the economy converges towards a situation without education (h∞ = 2c) and
in which θ∞ = (1− λ)[c/(c+ b)]
κ/(1−γ) < 1.
Consider the case in which h˜(1) < 2c. From Proposition 1, the dynamic
system (26) exhibits either one globally stable equilibrium in the gender
inequality regime (Figure 4(a)), or one globally stable equilibrium in the in-
terior regime (Figure 4(b)). The stable equilibrium in the gender inequality
regime is named the inegalitarian steady state. It is characterized by a high
level of gender inequality, since only men are educated, and a level of human
capital equal to hhhgi . The stable equilibrium in the interior regime is named
the high-output steady state. It is characterized by a relative equality be-
tween men and women (both are educated) and high level of human capital.
Notice that, an intermediary configuration could arise in which both the
high-output and the inegalitarian steady states are locally stable (see Figure
5).
5.4 Comparative statics
As previously mentionned, a poverty trap exists only if h˜(1) > 2c, that is
under the condition:
τ > (2c+ b)aβ/c (29)
It follows that, either a decrease in τ or an increase in the productivity
parameters (a or b) allow to escape from the poverty trap. Conversely, the
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Fig. 5. The inegalitarian and high-output steady states are both locally stables
cultural parameter λ does not impact on the probability of occurence of the
trap. The effect of a rise in c on the possibility to escape from the poverty trap
is ambigous. On one hand, it allows to reach a higher level of development
(upward shift of the hh locus) and then to step out from the poverty regime.
On the other hand, increasing the productivity of basic skills, it reduces the
incentives to invest in education (upward shift of h˜(θt)).
The two following lemmas expose the consequences of changes in main
parameters on the inegalitarian and high-output equilibria respectively.
Lemma 1 Under conditions (22) and (27):
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i An increase in a (as a decrease in τ) makes the inegalitarian equilibrium
more unequal but characterized by a higher level of human capital.
ii An increase in c has an ambigous effect on the level of inequality at the
inegalitarian equilibrium, however it rises the level of human capital.
iii An increase in λ makes the inegalitarian equilibrium more unequal and
leave the level of human capital unchanged.
An increase in a corresponds to a rise of the productivity of education.
It is straighforward that it implies an upward shift of the hh locus. It also
induces a shift towards the left of the θθ locus in the gender inequality regime.
Indeed, in this regime, only men are educated and then take advantage of
the increase of a. It implies an augmentation of the relative advantage of
men on the labor market which, in turn, decreases the relative labor supply
of women. Consequently, the level of θt which corresponds to stationarity
decreases in a. The same mechanisms apply in the case of a fall of τ .
A rise of the productivity of basic skills (c) has two opposite effects on
inequalities at the inegalitarian equilibrium. On one hand, it implies an
upward shift of the hh locus which induces an augmentation of the level of
human capital and the level of inequality. Indeed, the increase of ht enables
a higher education for the boys and, since girls receive no education, an
increase in the gender gap. On the other hand, men and women share the
same level of basic skills. Then an increase of c implies a reduction of the
weight of physical strenght and education in labor productivity which in turn
increases the relative labor supply of women.
The level of λ does not affect the hh locus. However, a rise of λ makes the
slow moving compoment of the cultutral norm more inegalitarian. It follows
a shift towards the left of the θθ locus.
Lemma 2 Under conditions (22) and (27):
i An increase in a (as a decrease of τ) makes the high-output equilibrium
less unequal and characterized by a higher level of human capital.
ii An increase in c makes the high-output equilibrium less unequal and
characterized by a higher level of human capital.
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iii An increase in λ makes the inegalitarian equilibrium more unequal and
characterized by a lower level of human capital.
In the interior regime both men and women receive education, a rise
of a (as a rise of c or a decrease of τ) induces a decreases in the relative
wheight of physical strenght in labor productivity. It generates an increase
of the relative labor supply of women and a shift towards the right of the θθ
locus. A positive shock on productivity parameters (a and c) or a negative
shock on costs of education (τ) also increases the level of human capital at the
stationary equilibrium. Since the level of θt which corresponds to stationarity
in the interior regime is increasing in ht, the rise in the level of human capital
reincorces the fall of the gender gap due to the displacement of the θθ locus.
The effect of an increase of λ on two loci is the same than in the gender
inequality regime: hh locus unchanged and θθ locus translated towards the
left. However, in the interior regime, the decrease of the stationary value
of θt implies a lower level of human capital at the steady state. Indeed, θt
corresponds to the value given to the education of girls, if θt is low, girls
receive few education and the ht is low too.
It follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 some conditions under which the economy
exhibits a unique high-output equilibrium. These conditions are exposed in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Under conditions (22) and (27):
i Economies with sufficiently high value of a or sufficiently low value of
τ will exhibit a unique high-output equilibrium.
ii A low level of λ increases the probability that an economy exhibit a
unique high-output equilibrium.
If the increase of a is high enough, the upward shift of the hh locus is
sufficiently large and the inegalitarian equilibrium disapears. In that case the
accumulation of human capital allows to escape from the gender inequality
regime and the economy converges towards the unique high-output equilib-
rium. Same results apply for a sufficiently large reduction of τ . As pointed
out in Lemma 1, a negative shock on λ induces a shift towards the right of
the θθ locus. It may imply a disapearance of the inegalitarian equilibrium.
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Indeed, for a given level of human capital, less traditional are the views about
gender roles, higher are the incentives to educate girls. However, a change in
λ is not always sufficient to induce the convergence towards the high-output
equilibrium. Indeed, due to difference in physical strenght’s endowments
between men and women, the cultural norm is inegalitarian even if λ = 0.
Notice that, as in the case of the poverty trap, the effect of c on the
possibilities of step out from the gender inequality equilibrium is ambigous.
Indeed, it increases the level of development and then the possibility to invest
in human capital however it reduces the incentives to invest in education.
Consequently, the level of human capital required to educate girls increases
with c.
6 The dynamic pattern of development
This section deals with the dynamic consequences of technical progress for
an economy initially poor. Without loss of generality, it focuses on the case
in which λ = 0, i.e. views about gender roles are fully endogenous.
6.1 Escape from the poverty trap
Consider an economy characterized by a low technological level (such that
h˜(1) > 2c) and is initially poor (such that h0 < h˜(1)). As depicted in Figure
7, this economy remains trapped in a low-output equilibrium.
In this situation, there is no education expenditures in the economy. In-
dividuals are only endowed with their basic mental skills and, for men, with
physical strength. Thanks to this physical strength, men are more productive
than women on the labor market, then their level of participation is higher.
These differences in the labor supply shape individuals beliefs about gender
roles. Since the relative labor supply is constant, the parameter θ progres-
sively converges towards a stationary value (θ¯). Higher is b (the endowment
in physical strength), higher is the relative labor supply of men, thus the
more inegalitarian are views about gender roles. Consequently, if a technical
improvement allows to step out from the poverty trap, parents will favor the
education of boys with respect to the education of girls.
Notice that, in the configuration depicted in Figure 7, another locally
stable equilibrium could exist: the inegalitarian steady-state. However, the
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Fig. 6. Dynamics when a is low: Convergence towards the poverty trap
economy cannot escape from the poverty trap without an exogenous shock
lowering h˜(1). From (29) such a shock could be an increase of technological
level (a or b) or a fall of education costs (τ). Consider the case of an increase
of a, if it is large enough to ensure that h˜(1) becomes lower than 2c, the
economy escapes from the poverty trap. In that case, the dynamics of the
economy is characterized by one of the three situations depicted in section
5.3. The long-run behavior of the economy depends on the range of the
technological improvement (increase of a).
From Proposition 2, for a large enough increase of a, the dynamics is
depicted by Figure 4(b) and the economy converges towards the high-output
steady state. Starting from the situation of Figure 7, this last case is illus-
trated in Figure 8. It represents the consequences of a shock such that the
new technological level (a′) is sufficiently high to ensure the global stability
of the high-output steady state.
In this situation, the accumulation of human capital enables to escape
from the gender inequality regime and parents begin to educate their daugh-
ter. It follows an increase of the relative productivity of women. Conse-
quently, the relative labor supply of men decreases and beliefs about gender
roles become less traditional (θt increases). In the long-run, the economy
converges towards the high-output equilibrium characterized by a relatively
large equality between gender. Notice that, the equality is never complete
since it remains the initial differences of productivity due to the physical
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Fig. 7. Dynamics when a is high: Convergence towards the high-output equilibrium
strength. However, the accumulation of education reduces the weight of this
initial difference.
6.2 U-shaped female labor participation
Several studies point out a U-shaped relationship between women labor sup-
ply and economic development both in cross country and on longitudinal
data. Mammen and Paxson (2000) explain this pattern as follows: "For
very poor countries, female labor force participation is high, and women
work mainly in farm and non-farm family enterprises. Development initially
moves women out of the labor force, partly because of the rise in men’s mar-
ket opportunities and partly because of social barriers against women entering
the paid labor force. However, as countries continue to develop, women’s ed-
ucation level rise, and women move back into the labor force". The present
model aims at replicating this pattern. As Mammen and Paxson (2000) and
Goldin (1995), it insists on the role of social norms as an explanation of
these evolutions. Indeed, the inegalitarian social norms imply that, in the
first stage of development, only men are educated. It follows that the relative
opportunities of men on the labor market rise and the women labor supply
falls. The rise of women education inverses this trend since it induces the
reduction of the productivity gap between men and women.
The model leads to the same conclusions from a cross-country point of
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view. Indeed, the dynamics exhibits potentially three steady states, each one
corresponding to a stage of development. The poverty trap, characterized by
a low level of human capital, is located in the left part of the U. At the
inegalitarian equilibrium, the level of development is higher and the women
labor supply is lower (at the bottom of the U curve). Finally, the high-output
equilibrium corresponds to the right part of the U.
Notice that, the initial increase of women’s housework rises the relative
productivity of men’s housework. This effect could induce a decrease of
men’s labor participation in the first stage of development (see expression
(8)). However, it should be compensate by the sharp increase in the relative
productivity of men on the market. In the second stage of development
(rising part of the U), a slight decrease of the men’s labor supply may occur
due to the decrease of their relative productivity on the market.
7 Slow-moving social norms
This section focuses on the role played by the slow moving compoment of cul-
tural norms (captured by the parameter λ) on the long-run situation reached
by the economy. As mentioned in section 5.4, an increase in λ has no conse-
quences on the hh locus but shifts the θθ locus towards the left. Then, two
countries having the same technological characteristics but which differ by
their level of λ could converge towards different situations. Such a case is
illustrated in Figure 8.
In the country (b), the conservative slow moving component of culture is
reinforced by the fast moving component during the process of development.
As a consequence, the country cannot escape from the gender inequality
regime.
One possible interpretation of the parameter λ is the weight attached to
the religion. Guiso et al. (2006) point out that religion could be considered
as an exogenous social norm or, at least, as a slow moving component of
culture.14 Moreover, Guiso et al. (2003) show that religiosity is positively
14Assuming that religion is an exogenous variable is obviously a first approximation.
Indeed, economic development also affect religious particpation (see McCleary and Barro
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Fig. 8. The impact of λ
related with conservative attitudes towards women. Following this interpre-
tation, the model predicts that a society in which the weight of religious
values is important will be characterized by larger gender inequality. This
result complies with findings of Inglehart and Norris (2003) which point out
that societies based on religious values are most likely to exhibit a strong gen-
der gap and a low acceptance of gender equality. In the same way Alesina
and Giuliano (2007) find a negative relationship between religion and women
labor force participation and that religion reinforces the traditional views
about gender roles. Finally, Dollar and Gatti (1999) conclude that gender
differences in educational achievement partly result from religious prefer-
ences.
Taking the example of the second Vatican council, Guiso et al. (2003)
show that a change in religious doctrine can reduce the conservative attitudes
against women. The model predicts that such a cultural change could have
a long-run impact both on the level of gender inequality and the level of
economic development.
(2006) for a discussion on the two-way interaction between religion and economic out-
comes). The model could be extended in considering the parameter λ as endogenous but
in taking into account that the adjustement of λ is slower than the variations of ψ.
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8 Foreign Direct Investments and evolution of
the gender gap
As previously discussed, changes in productivity parameters have strong im-
plications on the evolution of the gender gap. In the context of developing
countries, Foreign Direct Investments (hereafter FDI) constitute a key vari-
able in the change of technological and productivity levels. While the re-
lationship between FDI and economic growth has been deeply investigated,
their impact on gender inequalities is poorly known. A noticeable excep-
tion is the recent study of Oostendorp (2004) which points out the different
consequences of FDI with respect to the developement level of the host coun-
try and the skills level of the concerned sectors. In particular, the author
concludes to a narrowing impact of FDI net inflows on the gender gap for
low-skill occupations both in poor and rich countries and for high-skill occu-
pations in rich countries; while he finds a widening impact on the high-skill
occupational gender gap in poor countries.15
The present model provides explanations to this puzzle. In our frame-
work, the impact of a FDI net inflows’ rise on low-skill (respectively high-
skill) occupations is approximated by the augmentation of the parameter c
(respectively a). Indeed, an increase of c corresponds to a positive shock on
basic skills while an increase of a corresponds to a positive shock on returns
to education. Lemmas 1 and 2 highlight the different impacts of these two
shocks on the gender gap for a poor country (at the inegalitarian equilibrium)
and a rich country (at the high-output equilibrium). While an increase in c
may reduce the gender gap for both equilibria, an increase in a widens the
gap at the gender inequality equilibrium and narrows it at the high-output
equilibrium.
Notice that a decrease of the educational costs (τ) has the same conse-
quences than an increase of a. In countries at the inegalitarian steady state,
the reduction of τ allows for a better access to schooling for the boys and
increase the gender gap (Lemma 1). However, if the fall is large enough,
the economy escapes from the inegalitarian equilibrium and converges to the
high-output one (Proposition 2). In that case, the gender gap narrows. At
the high output equilibrium, a decrease of τ reduces the gender gap (Lemma
15The author uses data from the ILO october inquiry for the period 1983-1999. High-skill
occupations are defined as those occupations in the bottom half of the wage distribution.
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2).
9 Discussion
This section discusses possible extensions of the basic model. Specifically, the
following possibilities are successively addressed: (i) women are discriminated
on the labor market, (ii) the technological progress evolves endogenously, and
(iii) the choices of fertility are endogenous.
9.1 Discrimination on the labor market
A consensus about the existence of discrimination against women on the la-
bor market has progressively emerged in the economic literature (see Altonji
and Blank (1999) for a survey). Taking into account this discrimination in
the model does not qualitatively affect the results and allows to relax the
assumption that men and women exhibit a difference in physical strength.
Assume that, due to the discrimination, wf = h(ef )− d while wm = h(em).
The fact that the amount d (which measures the level of discrimination) is
unaffected by the level of human capital is a restrictive assumption. However,
it complies with the Goldin (1995) thesis that the social stigma against work-
ing women decreases as the level of human capital increases. Notice that, d
can be alternatively regarded as a psychological cost suffered by women at
work due to the social pressure.
The existence of a discrimination between men and women induces an
exogenous gender gap. It plays the same role that the physical strength in
the analysis. Consequently, results of the model are unaffected: Due to this
initial gender gap, men work more on the market than women. It follows
in an inegalitarian view of gender role which generates an extension of the
gender gap in early stages of development.
The fact that the discrimination on the labor market can be internalized
and lead to a change in the definition of gender roles is present in the articles
of Escriche et al. (2004) and Escriche (2007). It modifies the economic policy
implications of the model. Anti-discriminatory policies (inducing a reduction
of d) allows to escape from the gender inequality trap and makes the high-
output equilibrium more egalitarian. However, such policies could not be
sufficient to step out from the poverty trap.
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9.2 Endogenous technical progress and the road to equal-
ity
As noticed in section 6.1, the high-output equilibrium is characterized by a
relative equality between men and women. However, at this equilibrium, the
educational gender gap is not completely filled. This result is inconsistent
with the actual situation of developed countries where the educational gender
gap tends towards zero. The model can replicate the convergence of human
capital levels of men and women considering the existence of technological
progress. If a grows at rate ga > 0, the weight of b in the relative productivity
of men and women progressively disappears and the level of girls’ education
converges towards the level of boys’ education. However, as shown in sec-
tion 6.1, a constant increase of a implies the disappearance of the gender
inequality trap.
One way to reconciliate the road to equality of developed countries with
the possibility of inequality traps in developing countries is to consider that
the technological progress is endogenous but that a sufficient level of human
capital is required to engage the process. In line with Strulik (2003), the
following formulation of technological progress is considered:
∆at =
{
0 if ht < hˆ
ga(ht) if ht ≥ hˆ
(30)
with ga(ht) ≥ 0.
16 It implies that the endogenous technical progress gets
under way only if the level of human capital is sufficiently high. Under this
assumption and if hˆ is higher than hhhgi and lower than the human capital
accumulated at the high equilibrium, the inegalitarian equilibrium is not
destabilized and one economy which reaches the high equilibrium grows and
takes the road to equality.
9.3 Fertility behaviors
A major weakness of the model is to consider fertility behaviors as exogenous.
It avoids the possibility to study the fertility transition and to precisely
calibrate the model. However, this restriction allows for focusing on the
16In order to satisfy the condition (22), the increase in a must be bounded. Under the
assumption that h(eit) exhibits decreasing retruns, no restriction have to be impose on the
function ga(ht).
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share of domestic labor between men and women. Up to now, the two-sex
dynamics models with endogenous fertility (Galor and Weil (1996), Lagerlöf
(2003) or de la Croix and Vander Donckt (2008)) do not consider this aspect
since they find a complete specialization of tasks within the household: Child
rearing is devoted to women. In this framework, the women labor supply is
directly linked with fertility behaviors since it consists in the time not spent
to rear children.
A realistic middle way would be an endogenous fertility model in which
both men and women can participate to child rearing. As the domestic
production in the model, the production function of children could depend,
in a non linear way, on lf and lm. Such a model should be able to generate a
period where both fertility decreases (due to the increase of the quantity cost)
and women labor supply reduces (due to the rise of the gender productivity
gap), during first stages of the transition from the Malthusian poverty trap
to the high-output/low-fertility equilibrium.
10 Conclusion
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education is the forth
Millennium Summit Development target. The reduction of the educational
gender gap is an aim in itself but also a mean for the economic development.
The present article highlights the negative relationship between gender in-
equality and development. It points out the existence of gender inequality
traps associated with low economic performances. Moreover, it insists on the
role of cultural norms on the persistence of such traps.
The model is also capable to replicate some stylized facts concerning the
pattern of development of West Europe and United States. The process
of economic development comes with a U-shaped evolution of the women
labor supply and the progressive decreases of the educational gender gap.
In line with the empirical evidences provided by Goldin (1995), the present
model highlights the role played by stigma against women in early stages of
development on this pattern.
The present article also provides testable findings on the relationship
between FDI and the evolution of the gender gap. It predicts that FDI
flows targeted towards low-skill occupations would narrow the gender gap
in both poor and rich countries, while FDI flows targeted towards high-skill
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occupations have a widening impact on the gender gap in poor countries and
a narrowing impact in rich countries. This result directly comes from the fact
that only men receive education in poor countries. This result is obviously
restrictive. However, if the educationnal gender gap is high, an increase in the
returns to education (due to FDI net inflows) may disproportionally benefit
to men workers rather than women.
Finally, the model is in the line with a growing literature trying to relate
religion to beliefs or values influencing economic growth. Putman (1993), La
Porta et al. (1997) an Inglehart (1999) focus on the relationship between
religion and the level of trust. Landes (1998) argues that the culture of
intolerance diffused by Catholic Church impeded the development of Spain
in the 16th and 17th century. Guiso et al. (2006) find evidence on the impact
of religion on preferences for redistribution and, in turn, of such preferences
on the amount of redistribution that occurs. According to the present article,
the economic outcomes of a country can also be affected by religion through
its impact on gender role attitudes. Since both the relationship between
religion and views about gender role and the relationship between gender
inequality and growth have been highlighted (see Guiso et al. (2003) for the
first and Knowles et al. (2002) for the second), this channel seems relevant.
However, it needs to be more deeply investigated.
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Appendices
A Analysis of the hh locus
Poverty regime
If ht < h˜(1), neither boys nor girls are educated, then ht+1 = ht = 2c (see
Section 4.5). As a consequence, the hh locus consists in the horizontal line:
h = 2c. Notice that, if 2c > h˜(1), this locus of stationarity is outside of the
poverty regime, then the economy always escape from this regime.
Gender inequality regime
In that case, the set of values of ht such that ∆ht = 0 is denoted h
hh
gi From
(21) this locus of stationarity of ht is:
hhhgi =
c+ χ(0)(ab+ τc)
1− aχ(0)
=
τc(1 + 2β) + abβ
τ + (τ − a)β
(31)
Which is positive under condition (22). Hence, the hh locus consists in the
horizontal line such that h = hhhgi .
Interior regime
In this regime, the set of values of ht such that ∆ht = 0 is denoted h
hh
i (θt).
From (21), this locus of stationarity is:
hhhi (θt) =
χ(θt)(1 + θt)(ab+ 2τc)
1− aχ(θt)(1 + θt)
=
β(1 + θt)(ab+ 2τ)
τ + (τ − a)β(1 + θt)
(32)
Which is positive under condition (22) and is increasing and concave in θt.
Then, in the plan (ht, θt), the hh locus in the case of the interior regime
consists in an increasing and concave function denoted hhhi (θt).
Moreover, it is straightforward that the solution of the equation hhhgi =
h˜(θt) is the same than the solution of the equation h
hh
i = h˜(θt), that is:
θt =
[(1 + β)τ − aβ]c
β[a(c+ b) + τc]
(33)
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B Analysis of the θθ locus
Poverty regime
In this regime, neither men nor women are educated. However, men display
a higher productivity since they are endowed with physical strength. From
(20a), (20b) and (25), the evolution of θt is given by:
∆θt = θt+1 − θt = (1− σ)
[
(1− λ)
(
c
c+ b
) κ
1−γ
− θt
]
(34)
Then, in the plan (ht, θt), the θθ locus consists in the vertical line of equation
θ = (1− λ)[c/(c+ b)]κ/(1−γ) < 1.
Gender inequality regime
From (20a), (20b) and (25), the evolution of θt in this regime is given by:
∆θt = (1− σ)
[
(1− λ)
(
c
χ(0)[a(ht + b) + τc] + b
) κ
1−γ
− θt
]
(35)
In that case, the set of values of ht such that ∆θt = 0 is denoted h
θθ
gi (θt).
From (35), this locus of stationarity of θt is:
hθθgi (θt) =
τc(1 + β)(1− λ)
1−γ
κ
aβθ
1−γ
κ
t
−
β(τc+ ab) + τb(1 + β)
aβ
(36)
It is a decreasing and a convex function of θt, with h
θθ
gi ((1−λ)[c/(c+b)]
κ/(1−γ)) =
h˜(1) and limθt→0 h
θθ
gi (θt) = +∞.
By (35), the level of θt at the point of intersection between h˜(θt) and
hθθc (θt) is given by the equation:
θt = (1−λ)
(
c
χ(0)[a(h˜(θt) + b) + τc] + b
) κ
1−γ
= (1−λ)
(
cθt
c+ bθt
) κ
1−γ
≡ m(θt)
(37)
with m(0) = 0, m(1) = (1 − λ)[c/(c + b)]
κ
1−γ ∈ (0, 1), m′(θt) > 0 and
m′′(θt) < 0. Then a unique value of θt ∈ (0, 1) is solution of the equation
(37). It follows that hθθc (θt) crosses h˜(θt) only once.
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Interior regime
In the case of an interior solution on educational choices (ht > h˜(θt)), the
equation of evolution of θt can be rewritten as:
∆θt = (1− σ)
[
(1− λ)
(
χ(θt)θt[a(ht + b) + 2τc]
χ(θt)[a(ht + b) + 2τc] + b
) κ
1−γ
− θt
]
(38)
The set of values of ht such that ∆θt = 0 is denoted h
θθ
i (θt). From (38), this
locus of stationarity of θt is:
hθθi (θt) =
bθ
1−γ
κ
t
aχ(θt)
(
(1− λ)
1−γ
κ θt − θ
1−γ
κ
t
) − ab+ 2τc
a
(39)
Under condition (27), hθθi (θt) is an increasing of θt with limθt→1 h
θθ
i (θt) = +∞.
By (38), the level of θt at the point of intersection between h˜(θt) and
hθθgi (θt) is given by the equation:
θt = (1− λ)
(
χ(θt)θt[a(h˜(θt) + b) + 2τc]
χ(θt)[a(h˜(θt) + b) + 2τc] + b
) κ
1−γ
= (1− λ)
(
cθt
c+ bθt
) κ
1−γ
(40)
It results that hθθgi (θt) and h
θθ
gi (θt) cross h˜(θt) at the same point.
C Proof of Proposition 1
It follows from (34), (35) and (38) that the θθ locus is stable. Then, ∆θt is
positive (negative) if the economy is at the left (at the right) ot the θθ locus.
In the same way, it follows from (21) that the hh locus is stable. It results:
∆ht


> 0 if ht < 2c
= 0 if ht = 2c
< 0 if ht ∈ (2c, h˜(1))
> 0 if ht ∈ [h˜(1),max{h
hh
gi , h
hh
i (θt)})
= 0 if ht = max{h
hh
gi , h
hh
i (θt)}
< 0 if ht > max{h
hh
gi , h
hh
i (θt)}
(41)
If 2c ≤ h˜(1), the θθ locus and the hh locus crosses in the poverty regime. It
results in one stable equilibrium in this regime, i.e. for all values of ht lower
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than h˜(1) the economy converges towards this equilibrium. Conversely, if
2c > h˜(1), the θθ locus and the hh locus do not cross in the poverty regime.
For all values of ht lower than h˜(1), ∆ht > 0, then the economy escapes from
the poverty regime.
Finally, It follows from the representation of the two loci (Figure 2 and
3), that the hh locus and the θθ locus crosses at least once and at most three
outside of the poverty regime.
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